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Abstract In territories of medical uncertainty, clinical encounters are highly 
contentious. To uncover maintaining mechanisms behind persistent conflicts, we 
explore the interactional dynamics of clinical encounters fused with medical uncer-
tainty. Based on a thematic qualitative analysis of experiential texts from 385 peo-
ple living with medically unexplained physical symptoms in Norway, UK, Ireland, 
USA and Canada, we explore patients’ main expectations, how these expectations 
are met, and how their expectations and experiences are socially constructed and 
structurally conditioned. Five fundamental expectations are identified: Health pro-
fessionals ought to (1) acknowledge the lack of medical knowledge, and be frank, 
open and curious about it; (2) believe patient experiences and accept their condition 
as “real”; (3) avoid blaming patients for their ailment; (4) demonstrate compassion, 
understanding and respect; and (5) share decision-making power with patients. Our 
participants experience unfulfilled expectations in all five areas. Both experiences 
and unfulfilled expectations are influenced by structural factors transpiring from the 
modern Western biomedical paradigm, and from cultural norms and values of its 
surrounding society. Structural and cultural forces obstruct team-oriented collabo-
ration based on congruent understandings, mutual trust and reciprocated respect. 
Without such contextualisation, the interactional dynamics between patients and 
health professionals in clinical consultations cannot be exposed.
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Introduction
As a social institution, the medical system is embedded in a continually changing 
sociocultural context. Together with medical and technological developments, the 
sociocultural context influences the organised framework and the informal culture 
of the medical system. Structural and cultural changes influence the roles of all 
actors involved, as well as the interactions between them (Parsons 1951; Freidson 
1970).
In modern Western societies, the medical system (in which doctors are the 
main actors) is based on scientific knowledge that ought to be experimentally 
tested and proven, theoretically explained and technologically validated (Jewson 
2009). The foundation for this paradigm includes the invention of the microscope 
in 1590, the development of bacteriology in the nineteenth century, and knowl-
edge about the human anatomy and physiology developed during the last century. 
New knowledge and new technology has altered our understanding of health and 
illness, including our knowledge acquisition. Today, concepts and theories from 
biology, physics and chemistry are centrally placed in conceptions and explana-
tions of diseases (Toombs 1992). The biomedical conceptualisation gives onto-
logical primacy to the biological body, and human ailments are verified through 
technological tests. This perspective is often defined as the authoritative “truth”, 
and expert accounts of health and illness are privileged over lay accounts. Given 
this cultural hierarchy of knowledge, it might be considered legitimate for health 
professionals—in the name of professional expertise—to remove from laymen the 
right to define the situation (Freidson 1970). The very foundation for this legiti-
macy lies in biomedical knowledge. When such knowledge is lacking, clinical 
encounters between doctors and patients become riddled by medical uncertainty. 
Far-reaching expansions of the medical jurisdiction, even beyond areas substanti-
ated by medical knowledge (Busfield 2017), make this an increasingly relevant 
field of research.
Medical uncertainty involves a lack of certainty relating to diagnosis, progno-
sis, casual factors (aetiology) and/or likely results of various treatment options 
(Han et al. 2011). Most clinical encounters are to some extent infused with medi-
cal uncertainty in one way or another, for various reasons (Han et  al. 2011). In 
this paper, we limit our discussion to situations in which the uncertainty origi-
nates from a lack of medical knowledge, more specifically the so-called medi-
cally unexplained physical symptoms. Our main reasons for choosing this focus 
are twofold. The first one is mainly theoretical: medically unexplained bodily ail-
ments are theoretically and sociologically interesting because the ways in which 
we think about these phenomena reflects “complex social and political forces” 
(De Maio 2010, p. 2). Cultural norms and values affect the ways in which both 
lay and medical perceptions of these ailments are shaped, sustained and changed 
(Freidson 1970; Wright and Treacher 1982). The less medical knowledge we 
have, the larger the space for cultural imprints becomes. If we want to uncover 
the cultural contingency of medical constructions of health and illness, medi-
cally unexplained physical symptoms (MUPS) are particularly suitable. Another 
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reason relates to clinical relevance: somatic symptoms with no detectable organic 
pathology are challenging for doctor–patient interactions because such condi-
tions defy medical identification, medical explanation and evidence-based treat-
ment. Conflictual debates about these conditions are expressed in medical jour-
nals (Lian and Bondevik 2015), in public media (de Wolfe 2009), on the internet 
(Lian and Nettleton 2015) and in consultation rooms (Banks and Prior 2001). 
MUPS-consultations are characterised as a war-zone (Lian and Robson 2017), 
and described as one of the most challenging clinical encounters in contempo-
rary Western societies (Rief and Broadbent 2007). In consultation rooms, MUPS-
patients experience great dissatisfaction (Lian and Robson 2017; Rosendal et al. 
2013; Taylor et al. 2012; Weiland et al. 2012) and poor clinical outcomes (Rosen-
dal et al., 2013; Weiland et al. 2012). Health professionals report feeling helpless, 
inadequate and pressurised (Anderson et al. 2012; Dowrick et al. 2008; Salmon 
et al. 2005). Interactional difficulties might be related to the ways in which doc-
tors and patients experience, tolerate and act upon the uncertainty they have to 
deal with. Subjective perceptions of uncertainty might affect how both parties 
seek and exchange information, cope with uncertainty, and engage in shared deci-
sion-making (Hillen et al. 2017). In order to improve doctor–patient partnerships 
within the field of the medically unexplained, it might be useful to understand 
how doctors and patients collaborate to manage a mutual challenge: their inability 
to abolish medical uncertainty.
The aim of this paper is to study the ways in which interactional conflicts are 
sustained in a territory of medical uncertainty. Through a sociological analy-
sis of qualitative experiential data provided in writing by patients living with 
long-term illnesses, we explore the interactional dynamics of clinical encoun-
ters related to medically unexplained physical symptoms. Our data are limited 
to two subgroups of MUPS-patients: medically unexplained long-term fatigue 
(often named Myalgic Encephalomyelitis—ME, or Chronic Fatigue Syndrome—
CFS), and medically unexplained seizures (commonly labelled psychogenic non-
epileptic seizures—PNES, or non-epileptic attack disorder—NEAD). Both are 
medically unexplained contested chronic conditions with a wide range of severe 
debilitating symptoms. A vast majority of those who receive a diagnosis of medi-
cally unexplained fatigue or seizures (about three out of four) are women (Faro 
et al. 2016; McKenzie et al. 2010). While analysing the data, we asked: how do 
patients expect health professionals to respond to medical uncertainty; how are 
their expectations met, and in what ways are their expectations and experiences 
socially constructed and structurally conditioned? After classifying, presenting 
and discussing five main expectations, we explore their cultural embeddedness by 
situating patient experiences in their sociocultural terrain. Linking expectations 
and experiences of patients to underlying culturally contingent factors provide an 
alternative to the dominating individualistic perspective. Changing the “frame” 
within which we understand medically unexplained illnesses towards a cultural 
perspective might serve to unveil sources of persistent interactional difficulties 
between doctors and patients in territories of medical uncertainty.
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Design and data analysis
This study builds on qualitative data from two mixed-methods studies originating 
in Norway and England (one subset of data from each study). The data was col-
lected through  email surveys containing questions about how  study  participants 
experienced health care services received in relation to their ME/NES, performed 
to explore patient experiences among people living with medically unexplained con-
ditions. This paper builds on text from their responses to open-ended questions in 
these surveys.
Data and participants
Dataset 1 consists of 256 participants. The data were generated from an open-ended 
question included in an email survey conducted in Norway in April–May 2013. Par-
ticipants responded through an online system administered by a national centre for 
research data. Prior to distribution, the questionnaire was systematically tested and 
piloted among 143 people belonging to the targeted group. Invitations to participate 
were distributed to 811 members of the Norwegian ME-Association with known 
email addresses (about 40% of all members). Members were asked to refrain from 
participating if they were below the age of 16, or did not suffer from the condition 
themselves (health professionals, parents, others). Of the 488 people (60% of those 
approached) who submitted a return, we excluded 22 who did not give information 
about their age, gender or diagnosis. Of the remaining 466, 256 participants (55%) 
wrote free-text comments to the open-ended question: “Is there something that you 
want to tell us that you have not already done so far in this survey?”. Ninety per-
cent of respondents are women. Together, free-text comments amounted to 26,500 
words (on average, 100 words per respondent). After removing identifying informa-
tion, texts were translated to English by a professional translator. Translated texts 
were checked for consistency and accuracy by the first (native Norwegian) author. 
The study was granted ethical approval by the Norwegian Data Protection Official 
(id. 31784). Statistical data from sub-sets of female participants have been published 
(Lian and Hansen 2015; Hansen and Lian 2016a, b). Among other things, the statis-
tical analysis revealed a strong association between positive patient experiences and 
congruence in doctors and patients views on the illness (Lian and Hansen 2015).
Dataset 2 consists of 141 participants. It was generated through an in-depth web-
based survey advertised to members of 20 online support groups (not disclosed 
for reasons of confidentiality) for people with PNES/NEAD, referred to hereafter 
as non-epileptic seizures (NES). The survey was piloted among 25 people with the 
condition. The inclusion criteria were that participants had received a diagnosis of 
NES, and were over 18 years of age. Data were collected July–October 2016. A total 
of 141 participants submitted complete responses. Using the number of surveys 
started (289) as a proxy denominator suggests a completion rate of 49%. Six partici-
pants who reported a diagnosis other than NES and six Australian participants were 
excluded from the study, leaving 129 participants. Of these, 87% of are women. The 
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respondents are located in the UK and Ireland (72) and USA and Canada (57). Par-
ticipants responded to three separate open-ended questions, two mandatory (A&B) 
and one optional (C). Participants were asked to “please think about the” (A) “single 
best” and (B) “single worst” “interaction you have had with a health professional 
about NES” and to “In your own words, please describe what you” (A) “liked” and 
(B) “disliked” “about the interaction with the health professional?” (C): “In rela-
tion to NES, is there anything else you would like to tell us about your experiences 
of interacting with health professionals?” (69 participants responded). Together, 
texts amounted to around 20,000 words (on average, approximately 150 words per 
respondent). The study was granted ethical approval by Nelson Mandela Univer-
sity Human Research Ethics Committee (id. H16-RTI-RCD-002).
Data analysis
The purpose of the data analysis was to seek an interpretative understanding of par-
ticipant’s stories (Weber 1922), which means that they “hold truth in the sense that 
they allow us to understand reality from the point of view of the person expressing 
these comments” (De Maio 2010, p. 150). In line with this perspective, we do not 
question whether expressed experiences are right or wrong, good or bad.
Texts were analysed in collaboration between both authors using an inductive 
qualitative thematic approach (Braun and Clarke 2006), inspired by a grounded the-
ory strategy (Charmaz 2014; Glaser and Strauss 1967) and a constant comparative 
method (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Themes for the analysis were drawn inductively 
from each of the two datasets by identifying expectations stated directly or indirectly 
through descriptions of both met and unmet expectations. In stage one of the analysis, 
we identified as many themes as possible that emerged across each dataset (no themes 
were defined in advance). In stage two, we compared the results of both datasets, and 
settled on a list of five themes that appeared particularly important for both groups. 
We then classified meaning units related to the five themes, consistently for all texts, 
while continuously discussing and revising our interpretations. Using our data-driven 
codes, we then analysed the data systematically, first individually and then both of 
us together. While searching for both manifest and latent meaning of the texts, we 
used the interrogative pronouns “what”, “how”, “who” and “why”. De-condensation 
of key concepts used in the texts, such as “being understood” and “being believed”, 
was a vital part of this process. To ensure trustworthiness and theoretical saturation, 
we formulated and reformulated competing interpretations several times through an 
exploratory and case-led approach, and we rechecked our reading several times.
Results
After inductively developing themes emerging throughout both datasets, five main 
themes became particularly apparent. We start each theme by quoting expectations 
stated either explicitly or indirectly.
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Theme 1: Acknowledging the lack of medical knowledge
Although ME and NES are given medical names (diagnoses), these conditions are 
neither medically explained nor substantiated by positive biomedical markers. Par-
ticipants acknowledge the lack of medical knowledge about their illness, and they 
expect health professionals to do the same:
… I can’t expect my GP to have this [specialist] knowledge, but I can expect 
my GP to listen to what I have to say and respect me a person (ME7302).
My primary care physician. She has always been very understanding and 
extremely helpful even when neither of us knows what we are looking for 
(NES42582634).
I have been taken seriously even though they [GPs] have had no understanding 
of my ME illness (ME7299).
According to both groups, acknowledging the lack of medical knowledge demands 
open-mindedness and a willingness to learn more:
I am actually very satisfied with my GP; she knows little about the illness but 
has shown an outstanding willingness to learn more (ME7469).
The neurologist told me he didn’t know a lot about PNES but was very curious 
to learn (NES41429984).
Experiences of the opposite are more common in both groups:
…many [doctors] show disdain for patients when they themselves are uncer-
tain and find themselves in unknown territory. Why can’t doctors simply 
admit that they know little about this – instead of humiliating and mocking the 
patient when they are uncertain (ME7479).
Health professional are often evasive when answering questions, and there are 
subjects they seem keen to avoid (e.g. whether or not there is a psychogenic 
basis). They seem uncomfortable discussing the condition due to a lack of 
understanding (NES40933009).
I miss professional curiosity (ME7193).
Most of all, they dislike doctors who use unsubstantiated psychological theories:
… my symptoms were wrongly assumed to be mental (ME7802).
It is all too easy to blame psychological factors. It is often easy to do that when 
there is a dearth of medical knowledge and explanatory models (ME7202).
Health personnel in general all too easily utter the sentence: ‘It is probably something 
mental’ when there is something they can’t explain (ME7471).
It is very rare to find anyone in the medical profession that has any idea what NEAD is, 
therefore I am now just treated as someone with psychiatric illness (NES41438757).
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Both groups appreciate professionals who show, not only an open mind, but also 
demonstrate a willingness to investigate their symptoms and discuss them with the 
patient, but that is often not the case:
I found that my GP was so determined that the illness was mentally condi-
tioned that she didn’t feel she needed to investigate any further (ME7460).
I do not get tests run, I do not typically get evaluated, and am usually immedi-
ately discharged without the doctor even checking for injuries (NES41489271).
Theme 2: Being “believed” they are not “faking”
Despite uncertainties, participants expect health professionals to accept their condi-
tion as “real”. Contrary to this expectation, they describe health professionals who 
confuse the lack of knowledge and technological proofs of disease (bio-markers) 
with non-existing illness:
If neurologists don’t see it in a scan it doesn’t exist (NES44796812).
I was told by a specialist I was referred to that now I had been examined “from 
head to arse”, so now I finally had to understand that there was nothing [physi-
cally] wrong with me (ME7090).
The way he [the neurologist] looked at me like I was crazy […] basically tell-
ing me it was all in my head (NES44796812).
He [GP] yelled at me that this was a fake disease (ME7472).
[Neurologist] told me that there is nothing [physically] wrong with me 
(NES40949276).
One NES patient explained how seeing her seizures with their own eyes could be a 
‘proof-replacement’:
I ended up having a seizure right in front of her [the GP] and she just com-
pletely accepted it. It was a nice change for once to have a doctor on my side 
(NES40958621).
Both groups expect caregivers to acknowledge their experiences and accept their 
condition as real, and treat this as fact. Having their experiences taken seriously and 
being reassured that they have a “real” illness and not an imaginary “fake” condition 
existing merely “in their head” is absolutely vital:
Fortunately I have found a GP who at least shows an understanding of the fact 
that I am ill (ME7310).
After many years of battling with my old GP, today I have a GP who believes 
me (ME7459).
She [neurologist] reassured me that these types of seizures are in no way fake 
(NES43726369).
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My GP sat down and explained this to me and made sure I understood it is not 
all in my head (NES40947994).
Experiences of the opposite are more common among participants in both groups:
…. it is difficult to find a GP …. who wants to relate to ME as an illness 
(ME7461).
…. a psychiatrist …. said straight out that ME didn’t exist (ME7469).
He [GP] was so rude tried implying it was all in my head (NES40142452).
He [ER doctor] kept telling me I was faking and there is nothing wrong with 
me (NES41581556).
I haven’t met a single one who believes this is an illness (NES41163538).
Theme 3: Not being blamed
Participants appreciate being reassured that their illness is involuntary and not some-
thing they consciously ‘perform’ or control, and therefore they should not be blamed 
for it. NES patients express this need with reference to positive experiences:
[Neurologist]…. the first thing out of his mouth was that “it was not my fault.” 
I needed to hear that! (NES43714636).
NES was explained to me and what was happening was not intentional and I 
didn’t have control over it (NES40951076).
For most participants in both groups, however, these expectations are not met:
…. [Neurologist] told me it was all in my head and of my own doing …. said 
that because there were no abnormalities in my brain waves that it could be 
nothing else but voluntary (NES43714636).
In the end I collapsed from going for walks and was told [by GP] that ‘since 
I didn’t want to go for walks and take tablets, I could just go home. It was my 
own fault that I was ill!’ (ME7210).
… brushed aside by my GP who told me it was attributable to unhappiness (so 
the cause was mental) (ME7803).
…. they put pressure on patients to ‘pull themselves together’ (ME7066).
The blaming often relates to insulting accusations of being stressed, lazy, attention-
seeking or even hypochondriacs:
To be treated so badly, and also disbelieved and told that one is lazy, has an 
eating disorder, that it is a matter of willpower etc. when one is seriously ill, is 
a terrible additional strain (ME7066).
I was pretty much told [by hospital staff] that my condition didn’t really exist 
and that I was just hysterical and an attention seeker (NES41116112).
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All around, …. [health professionals] treat PNES as if it were an imaginary 
friend. Fake, irrational, and made up to seek attention (NES42477133).
The Swedish doctor [rheumatologist]… concluded that I was a hypochondriac, 
diagnosis neurasthenia” (ME7462).
Some participants in the ME-group link the blaming to prejudice attitudes against 
women, or relate disbelief to male health professionals:
I have had doctors at the hospital who laugh at me. They ask if I am one 
of those stressed housewife types before I have even opened my mouth 
(ME7202).
A lot of focus on the ‘good girl syndrome’ (ME7321).
He [GP] knows nothing about women and nothing about patients and patient 
reactions (ME 7670).
The doctor [GP] I had after that was a man, and didn’t take me so seriously 
(ME7440).
The participants link disbelief and blame to psychogenic explanations of their 
ailment:
They [neurologists] made me feel like it was my fault. That I somehow over-
stressed myself to the point that I couldn’t just handle it. So my body was 
reacting with these “fake” pseudoseizures. In other words it was all in my 
head and could be controlled if [I] would just adjust the stress in my life 
(NES43726369).
Theme 4: Demonstrate compassion, understanding and respect
Both groups expect health professionals to listen to them and demonstrate under-
standing, compassion and respect:
They [neurologists] showed compassion and understanding (NES42581346).
My doctor [GP] since 2007 until the present has much more empathy and an 
open attitude and most important of all, she listens to what I say (ME7362).
Both groups primarily experience unmet expectations in this area:
It is upsetting how little knowledge the health services have about ME and 
how rude they are; they have no knowledge of the illness and don’t listen to the 
patient at all (ME7562).
So frustrating as they [hospital staff] had no compassion or understanding and 
made me feel even worse about my condition (NES41575187).
Both groups express expectations of being treated as a (whole) human being:
For me, this illness is physical but of course it affects me mentally, I am after 
all a whole human being (ME7308).
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[Nurse] treated me like a human and that I was a genuine person…. (pretty 
unusual) (NES40933824).
This expectation is often not met:
They [specialists] don’t take the tests I want, they don’t believe me, they look 
for other things that are wrong, they overlook the problem, refuse to see the 
whole person, focus only on their specialism (ME7619).
Theme 5: Share authority on decisions
Both groups expect decisions to be made in a collaborative partnership with health 
professionals:
[GP] understands my needs, and supports me in what I want to do about my 
own health. I therefore think that my GP and I are a good team (ME7310).
She [GP] worked with me …. (NES42353316).
He [GP] was interested in listening to what I wanted (NES41610875).
…. We [GP] …. discussed treatment options. I felt like I had been included 
in the decision-making and been given some control over my condition 
(NES44584667).
The medical profession must cooperate with those who know and have dealt 
with this for many years (ME7231).
Both groups express disappointment in relation to co-determination:
…. doctors give us far too little right of co-determination with regard to our 
own health; as long as there is no treatment, the goal is to alleviate the symp-
toms, and doctors must become better at listening to what the patient thinks 
works best for them (ME7203).
Today they are completely helpless when they encounter us, and therefore they 
react by distancing themselves, both from us as patients and from our illness 
(ME7057).
I often have a feeling that most doctors are not on the side of ME patients, on 
the contrary they are an opponent (ME7202).
[Neurologist]… threatened to not care for me if I disagreed with her diagnosis 
and treatment plan (NES40947994).
Both groups describe incidents indicating a total lack of partnership:
One literally yelled at me and physically threw me out of his office after throw-
ing something at me from his desk (ME7066).
A general physician (local hospital), I was told, “never to go back there” 
(NES42227637).
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‘I don’t think they’ll find anything,’ he said. ‘You don’t need to come here any-
more’ (ME7202).
…. in a letter to my GP he wrote that under no circumstances must I be 
referred back to him (ME7462).
[Nurse to patient].… “get up you are wasting my time, why do I have to put up 
with patients like you” (NES4862903).
…. their main concern is to get rid of you (ME7625).
Summary of results
Through positive and negative descriptions, our study participants articulate—
directly or indirectly—the same basic expectations and experiences. Regarding 
expectations, the core message that runs through both datasets is that caregivers 
ought to
1. acknowledge the lack of medical knowledge; be frank, open and curious about 
medical uncertainties, and approach their condition with an open mind and a 
willingness to learn more (and above all, do not profess knowing what is not 
known);
2. believe patient experiences and the reality of their illness;
3. avoid moral blaming of patients;
4. treat patients with human dignity by demonstrating confidence, trust, respect, 
compassion, sympathy and understanding; and
5. share decision-making authority with patients in a collaborative partnership.
While positive experiences are expressed, the data are dominated by disappoint-
ment and dissatisfaction related to unmet expectations in all five themes. Partici-
pants’ strongest aversion is against health professionals who claim to know what is 
not known by proclaiming psychogenic explanations of their illness, or characterise 
it as fake or non-existent. This might be the main source of negative experiences. 
Our participants interpret psychogenic explanations as indirect accusations that their 
symptoms are their own fault, and existing only “in their heads”.
The only divergent pattern we found between the stories of the two groups is 
related to acknowledgement of their illness. Unlike ME-patients, some NES patients 
describe explicitly expressed acknowledgement from health professionals about 
their illness being “real” and not merely “faked”. This is most likely related to differ-
ences between their symptoms: seizures are more acute, more specific, more directly 
observable from outside and often visibly fierce. Apart from that, the stories of both 
groups of participants are surprisingly similar.
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The social and structural embeddedness of medically unexplained 
conditions: a theoretical analysis
The consistency of our participants’ stories indicates that their experiences ought to 
be interpreted as something more than individual assessments. Our assumption here 
is that they are consistent because patients’ individual expectations and experiences 
are culture-bearing interpretations shaped by culturally available norms and values, 
and therefore socially conditioned and constructed. Contextualising their individual 
experiences by locating them in a specific time and place might reveal their social 
and structural embeddedness. Apart from being individual experiences, we analyse 
the stories of our participants as expressions of the contours of the modern biomedi-
cal paradigm, the changing roles of patients and health professionals, and the cultur-
ally and historically contingent norms and values of Western industrialised societies.
Cultural norms and values
The stories of our ME-participants mirror cultural views on tiredness in our culture. 
Our cultural norms define tiredness as a sign of weakness; the norm is to be ener-
getic, tough, strong and endurable (Widerberg 2005). Cultural norms also prescribe 
how we ought to handle it: the (stereotyped) masculine response;  pull yourself 
together and “handle it like a man”, is the most culturally acceptable way (Wider-
berg 2005). Inability to cope with life events is also a core element in medical per-
ceptions of non-epileptic seizures, and the gender dimension is visible there too: 
female preponderance is explained by the social acceptability of overt emotional 
expression in women (Reuber and Elger 2003).
This is just one example of how the stories of our participants reflect the hall-
mark of modernity in Western societies, most importantly the individualistic notion 
of disembedded individuals acting on the basis of free will. The individualistic ‘tri-
umph of the will’ (Brown and Baker 2012, p. 32) has substituted societal factors 
with individual choices (unhealthy lifestyles) in medical explanations of diseases. 
The behavioural argument constitutes the core of a modern biomedical system in 
which individual freedom and responsibility are emphasised (Porter 2006). Within 
this perspective, allegedly susceptible vulnerable women who do not manage to live 
up to the ideals of culturally legitimate ways to handle tiredness and harsh life events 
risk social exclusion and stigmatisation from the successful majority.
Gendered or not, our participants describe how they experience being subjected 
to a stigmatising discourse with negative labelling and discrediting accusations 
(directed towards what they do and who they are) that leads to humiliation, shame, 
blame, stigma and social exclusion (Goffman 1963; Becker 1963). Because of the 
absence of medical acknowledgement, our participants experience what Freidson 
(1970) classifies as an illegitimate stigmatised illness. Being in this sick-role grants 
few, if any, privileges (ibid.). The psychiatric labels participants perceive to be 
awarded provide a stamp on behaviour that is regarded as socially unacceptable, and 
therefore often accompanied by social exclusion (Scheff 1974).
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Modern biomedical perspectives
Experiences of stigma expressed by our participants are also strongly linked to the 
modern biomedical paradigm, including the growing emphasis on evidence-based 
medicine. Within the biomedical paradigm, somatic symptoms without detect-
able organic pathology become unintelligible, incomprehensible, unexplainable 
and untreatable. It even becomes questionable whether their problems exist or not, 
because the criteria for existence—in an ontological sense—is what you can visually 
observe by the use technological tests. Among doctors, it is not uncommon to deny 
the very existence of MUPS-conditions (Anderson et al. 2012) or to explain them as 
psychogenic. In a culture where psyche and soma are separated and hierarchically 
structured (with the latter perceived as less real), and mental problems seen as signs 
of weakness, hence, self-inflicted (Jutel 2011), these medical perceptions easily lead 
to resentment from those who receive these labels.
Moreover, patients find it problematic when expert jurisdiction is claimed with-
out the knowledge it ought to rely on, and knowledge is replaced with normative 
judgements. For doctors, scepticism towards MUPS, including the belief that it 
does not exist, reflects their professional biomedical view of the condition as such. 
Within a biomedical frame of reference, this is a value-neutral scientific statement 
(illness does not exist until bio-medically accounted for). Seen from an experien-
tial perspective, patients easily perceive such statements not as value-neutral, but as 
personal, normative and judgmental. Based on cultural views of mental conditions, 
patients experience being held accountable for their illness and pressurised to pull 
themselves together, as if it was a “matter of willpower”. If they refuse to comply 
with treatments, do not get better, or their condition deteriorates, they perceive it is 
they—not the treatment or clinician—who are held responsible (“‘told … it was my 
own fault that I was ill!’”). Consequently—whether intended or unintended—doc-
tors transfer their scepticism towards the disease as a biomedical entity to patients’ 
illness experiences. Without distinguishing clearly between bio-medically defined 
disease and experientially defined illness, interactional conflicts in territories of 
medical uncertainty can neither be understood nor resolved.
New roles for doctors and patients
The strong discontent expressed in the stories of our participants must be seen in 
relation to on-going political efforts to move towards a less authoritative profes-
sional role vis-á-vis the patient, and develop patient-centred care (Sacristán 2013). 
Patient-centred care means incorporating the experiential perspective of patients, 
and respecting patient autonomy to ensure that clinical decisions are made in con-
cordance with patients’ wishes and needs on the basis of shared decision-making 
(Hurtado et  al. 2001). Recognising and respecting patients as persons with their 
own goals, expectations and needs is fundamental for this idea of clinical prac-
tice, which is rooted in a philosophy of people as purposeful, thinking, feeling, 
emotional, reflective and relational beings who are responsive to meaning (Cassell 
2010). Delivering evidence-based medical services of high quality, consistent with 
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the patient’s medical needs and in a way that fosters a doctor–patient partnership of 
equals and shared decision-making, is qualities strived for in all Western health care 
systems. These ideological trends are absorbed by our participants, but old power 
structures deeply ingrained in the medical system might restrict ideals of patient 
autonomy to mature, and thereby obstruct the process of change.
Strengths and limitations
Data were collected independently of service providers, and the identity of our par-
ticipants was never revealed to the researchers. This allowed respondents to describe 
their experiences without fearing negative consequences from healthcare provid-
ers. Giving them open-ended questions and allowing them to describe their experi-
ences in writing—with minimal researcher influence, no time-pressure and no word-
limit—granted them full freedom to reflect on whatever they found most important. 
Despite this freedom, participants distributed across Western nations told us remark-
ably similar stories, which we interpret as a validation of the openness of questions 
raised: it reveals that despite place of residence, MUPS-patients encounter common 
challenges that stem from having an illness that is impossible to “validate” through 
medical technology and knowledge. Using written texts instead of structured oral 
interviews, which has been the most common method so far, makes our study an 
original supplement to previous research, even in an international context.
Because of recruitment methods (based on membership of patient organisations 
or online support groups), the experiences of our participants might not be the same 
as other people with these conditions. A possible bias is that those who chose to 
participate in our study have more negative experiences than those who did not. We 
therefore do not claim that the views of our participants are representative for all 
patients with ME and NES, but they are useful in terms of exploring cultural and 
contextual factors contributing to interactional challenges. Our data might also be 
biased towards higher functioning patients (which is to be expected, as those most 
seriously affected were probably unable to participate). Also, men are underrepre-
sented in both patient groups. While interpreting the data, these possible biases have 
to be taken into account. We must also bear in mind that the stories of our par-
ticipants are retrospective (they recall experiences from consultations that happened 
some time ago), and therefore change as time goes by. Another weakness of our data 
is that the two patient groups were not asked identical questions. This renders a sys-
tematic comparative analysis of the two participant groups impossible.
Conclusion
Directly and indirectly, participants in this study express clear expectations towards 
caregivers: through sympathy, empathy and compassion, health professionals ought 
to demonstrate that they acknowledge patient experiences in a non-judgmental 
way, and act upon it through shared decision-making. In an insightful manner, the 
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participants describe unmet expectations in relation to all these aspects. One par-
ticipant summarises her experiences in a way that illuminates a core message given 
in our data: “All interactions have been negative with blaming, shaming, humilia-
tion, and emotional pain (NES43349947)”. Most participants describe tension-filled 
encounters dominated by interactional conflicts containing unresolved credibility 
and knowledge claims, demeaning behaviour and humiliating accusations.
In our culture, we often explain the ways in which human beings think, act and 
feel by employing a psychological perspective of individual personality and per-
sonal motives. Interactional difficulties discussed in this paper make no excep-
tion. “Why are ME-patients so angry?” a doctor asks (Johnson 2015). Similarly, 
one of our participants asks: why can’t doctors stop “humiliating and mocking the 
patient?  (ME7479)”. A major problem with this perspective is that is misses the 
inherently sociocultural dimension of our thoughts, actions and feelings. Through 
social interaction, cultural norms and values become our internalised norms and val-
ues. By exploring how individual experiences convey the sociocultural context in 
which they are nurtured, we have tried to move the frame of reference to a cultural 
level and offer a contextual perspective on the interactional dynamics of clinical 
consultations fused by medical uncertainty. This perspective also entails explanatory 
power: it serves to explain why expectations and experiences expressed by our study 
participants are so coherent.
In this paper, we interpret  the stories of our participants as expressions of an 
experienced systematic disrespect that transpires from the naturalistic empiricism 
of the modern western scientific biomedical paradigm, and from cultural norms and 
values of its surrounding society. The interactional dynamics they describe exhibit 
structurally conditioned forces inherent in the medical system, in the consultation 
room and in the minds of those who interact there. Although people handle the 
situation differently, structural forces influence the ways in which actors think and 
act. Acknowledging the structurally conditioned circumstances we act upon means 
accepting that experiences and expectations of all those who engage in the consulta-
tion room (patients as well as health professionals) are contingent upon a specific 
cultural context. Situating events within this context enable us to identify the under-
lying dynamics of structurally generated conflicts, and thereby prevent individual 
moral blame. Coupling agency and structure by exploring patient experiences in 
relation to medical and sociocultural systems reveals how the interactional dynamics 
of medical consultations in territories of medical uncertainty is socially constructed 
and structurally conditioned.
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